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Article 
Agreeing to Disagree: 
The Primacy Debate Between the German Federal 
Constitutional Court and the European Court of 
Justice 
John Henry Dingfelder Stone 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From the outside, the stability of the European Union (EU) 
and its central place on the European continent is taken for 
granted. Encompassing twenty-eight highly stable democracies 
bound together by a mutually beneficial economic union and a 
shared respect for fundamental rights,1 the EU is rarely 
considered anything other than a permanent fixture on the 
international scene. To American legal scholars unfamiliar with 
its particular workings, the EU may even bear some superficial 
resemblance to a European version of the American system of 
federal government. The Union plays the part of the American 
federal government, complete with legal supremacy over any 
contravening domestic Member-State laws. According to 
jurisprudence from the European Court of Justice (ECJ), there 
is some validity to this conception: both primary sources of 
regulation (such as EU treaties) and secondary sources (EU 
legislation) trump any contravening national laws or domestic 
constitutional provisions.2 
 
  Professor of Law, Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences, Kleve 
(Germany). B.A., J.D., University of Texas. LL.M., University of Nottingham. 
The author would like to thank Dr. Kathrin Scherr and Dr. Johann-Christoph 
Woltag, as well as his former colleagues at the Max Planck Foundation for 
International Peace and the Rule of Law, for their insightful comments and 
criticisms. Naturally, any and all errors are the author's responsibility alone.  
 1. See generally How The EU Works, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
 2. See Dieter Grimm, The European Court of Justice and National Courts: 
The German Constitutional Perspective After the Maastricht Decision, 3 COLUM. 
J. EUR. L. 229, 229–30 (1997); René Barents, The Precedence of EU Law from 
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However, the Member States that comprise the EU have 
historically been quite uninterested in peacefully assuming the 
role of subordinate federal states in a larger pan-European 
governmental system. This can be seen not only in the very 
public rejection by certain Member States of the European 
Union’s proffered ‘Constitutional Treaty,’ which leaned overtly 
in that direction,3 but also in other far less public, though still 
important, actions taken by the Member States to limit the 
primacy of the EU.4 Such actions not only dispel the myth that 
the EU has taken on the characteristics of a federal nation-state, 
but also directly contravene the deeply rooted and generally 
accepted legal rule that EU norms trump their domestic 
counterparts. It is no exaggeration to declare that the denial of 
EU primacy calls into question not only the long-term stability 
of the EU, but the very legal basis for the entire Union itself.5 
Germany, in particular, has charged rather stridently down this 
path in the past few decades, developing a relatively complicated 
legal relationship with the EU wherein its Federal 
Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVG), has 
rejected certain aspects of EU supremacy and asserted instead 
the primacy of the German Basic Law (i.e., the German 
 
the Perspective of Constitutional Pluralism, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 421, 424 
(2010); Andreas Voßkuhle, Multilevel Cooperation of the European 
Constitutional Courts: Der Europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund, 6 EUR. 
CONST. L. REV. 175, 190 (2010). 
 3. See, e.g., Dutch Say ‘Devastating No’ to EU Constitution, GUARDIAN 
(June 2, 2005), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/02/eu.politics 
(referring to the Netherlands); Elaine Sciolino, French Voters Soundly Reject 
European Union Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2005), http://www.
nytimes.com/2005/05/30/international/europe/30france.html?pagewanted=all&
_r=0 (referring to France). 
 4. See Mattias Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: 
Constitutional Supremacy in Europe Before and After the Constitutional Treaty, 
11 EUR. L.J. 262, 263 (2005) (“[I]t would be a mistake to conclude that all 
Member States have accepted the Court of Justice’s view that EU Law is the 
supreme law of the land. A significant number of national courts have instead 
held that they could set aside EU [l]aw on constitutional grounds under certain 
circumstances.”); see also Christina Eckes, Protecting Supremacy from External 
Influences: A Precondition for a European Legal Order, 18 EUR. L.J. 230, 234 
(2012) (“As is well-known national (constitutional) courts have not easily 
accepted the supremacy of European law within their national legal orders.”). 
 5. See Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 586, 594 (“It follows from all 
these observations that the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent 
source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden 
by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its 
character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community 
itself being called into question.”). 
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Constitution).6 The ideological origins of this development and 
its consequences for the future of the EU are equal parts 
unsettling and fascinating. 
The purpose of this Article is to assess the legal relationship 
that currently exists between the EU and Germany with respect 
to the primacy of their respective legal regimes. To do so, Part II 
will briefly examine the legal doctrine of supremacy as 
envisioned by the ECJ. Part III will then trace the development 
of the BVG’s case law with respect to the EU’s claim to 
supremacy. In this context, the relevant landmark decisions of 
the BVG will be highlighted and discussed. Parts IV–V will then 
analyze the current state of this relationship and potential 
future implications. 
II. THE EUROPEAN VISION OF UNION SUPREMACY 
As mentioned supra, the EU considers its framework of 
legislation and directives to have primacy over contravening 
domestic norms. Although the doctrine of primacy has been 
somewhat implicit in earlier ECJ decisions, its overt formulation 
originated in Costa v. ENEL, wherein the ECJ held that in any 
conflict between national and EU legal norms, EU laws were to 
be considered supreme.7 This doctrine was later extended in 
1970 by the ECJ in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft to include 
the supremacy of European laws over national constitutions as 
well8: 
[T]he validity of such measures can only be judged in the 
light of Community law. In fact, the law stemming from 
the Treaty, an independent source of law, cannot because 
of its very nature be overridden by rules of national law, 
however framed, without being deprived of its character 
as Community law and without the legal basis of the 
Community itself being called in question. Therefore the 
validity of a Community measure or its effect within a 
 
 6. See, e.g., id. 
 7. Id.; see also Franz C. Mayer, Supremacy–Lost?—Comment on Roman 
Kwiecień, 6 GER. L.J. 1497, 1498 (2005); Dieter Grimm, Defending Sovereign 
Statehood Against Transforming the Union into a State, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 
353, 355 (2009); Meinhard Hilf, Costa v. ENEL Case, in 2 MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 824, 824–25 (Rüdiger Wolfrum 
ed., 2013). 
 8. See Mayer, supra note 7, at 1498; see Grimm, supra note 2, at 230. 
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Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it 
runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated 
by the constitution of that State or the principles of a 
national constitutional structure.9 
Thus, from the perspective of the EU, any and all national 
legal norms must yield to their EU counterparts. The scope of 
this primacy is, therefore, “complete and unconditional.”10 The 
practical outcome of such an approach is that, where EU law and 
national norms collide, the national norm must be set aside and 
the EU law applied “in its entirety.”11 This does not, however, 
mean that the conflicting domestic provision is held to be null 
and void; rather it is simply not applied where it conflicts with 
an EU norm.12 
There are a number of logical reasons for imbuing EU norms 
with supremacy. First, the unconditional nature of the treaty 
obligations assumed by Member States in creating the EU is 
such that these obligations cannot be overturned by later, 
unilateral domestic acts.13 Second, allowing national laws to 
trump EU norms would create a legal landscape wherein the 
enforcement and application of EU norms differ from Member 
State to Member State.14 Such a variance would directly 
undercut the uniformity of legal standards that EU legislation 
is intended to bring about.15 Finally, the effectiveness of EU 
norms would be fatally undermined if such variability of 
enforcement existed.16 From the standpoint of the ECJ, denying 
EU law supremacy over domestic norms would call into question 
the very legal basis of the EU itself.17 
Given the necessity of the uniform application of EU norms 
throughout the Member States, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
 
 9. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr, 1970 E.C.R. 
1125, 1134 (alteration in original). 
 10. Barents, supra note 2, at 424. 
 11. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, 
1978 E.C.R. 629, 644. 
 12. See Barents, supra note 2, at 425. 
 13. See Hilf, supra note 7, at 824–25. 
 14. See Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 594. 
 15. See Mayer, supra note 7, at 1502; Barents, supra note 2, at 424; Gunnar 
Beck, The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court, the Primacy of 
EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: A Conflict Between Right 
and Right in Which There Is No Praetor, 17 EUR. L.J. 470, 472 (2011). 
 16. See Eckes, supra note 4, at 231; Barents, supra note 2, at 424; Mayer, 
supra note 7, at 1502. 
 17. See Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 594. 
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ensuring the uniform interpretation of EU law has also been 
considered of great importance by the ECJ. With this goal in 
mind, the ECJ has asserted itself as the sole authoritative 
interpreter of EU treaties and the competences of the EU 
generally.18 This is not to say that national courts do not 
interpret EU law; in fact, they are considered the “natural 
forum” for EU law, at least for most cases involving private 
individuals, and they generally interpret and apply EU law more 
than the designated EU courts do.19 In exercising this role, 
national courts must not only set aside domestic laws that are 
incompatible with their EU counterparts, but must also 
interpret their own laws, where possible, such that they are 
compatible with EU law.20 However, while national courts have 
the power to interpret and apply EU law, their jurisdiction stops 
short of allowing them to opine on the actual validity of any 
specific EU law.21 Since the ECJ is the sole interpretive 
authority with respect to EU treaties, it is also the only legal 
body that may declare that an EU law or act is not in compliance 
with those treaties.22 The natural consequence of this doctrine is 
that “national courts have no jurisdiction themselves to declare 
that acts of Community institutions are invalid.”23 
Grounds exist whereupon EU law might very well be invalid 
in a manner that is of some importance to the Member States. 
The EU is limited by the principle of conferral, whereby its 
competences are restricted to what the Member States have 
agreed upon in the applicable founding treaties.24 All other 
competences are left to, and exercisable by, the Member States.25 
 
 18. See Beck, supra note 15, at 472–473; see also Grimm, supra note 2, at 
236. 
 19. See MONICA CLAES, THE NATIONAL COURTS’ MANDATE IN THE 
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 58–59 (2006). 
 20. Id. at 67. 
 21. See Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 
4225, 4231–32. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 4232 (emphasis added); see also Franz C. Mayer, Rebels Without 
a Cause? A Critical Analysis of the German Constitutional Court’s OMT 
Reference, 15 GER. L.J. 115 (2014) (stating that national courts have no right to 
invalidate or declare EU law inapplicable); Jürgen Bast, Don’t Act Beyond Your 
Powers: The Perils and Pitfalls of the German Constitutional Court’s Ultra Vires 
Review, 15 GER. L.J. 171 (2014) (arguing that the ECJ has reserved the sole 
right to annul or declare an EU law invalid). 
 24. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5, Dec. 13, 
2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 18 [hereinafter Consolidated EU Treaty]. 
 25. Id. 
132 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 25:1 
Thus, while EU law is acknowledged as supreme over national 
norms, “its supremacy extends no further than the scope of the 
powers that Member States have chosen to confer on the 
Union.”26 Acting beyond its conferred powers would render the 
resulting EU law invalid, yet only an EU organ in the form of 
the ECJ, is allowed to make this determination. As such, the 
ECJ claims the sole authority (known as Kompetenz-Kompetenz) 
to determine the outer limits of the conferred competences of the 
EU, even though these specific limitations were established by 
the Member States.27 
Another area where EU laws might be considered invalid 
involves the limitations set out in national constitutions. Since 
the EU may only exercise those powers voluntarily granted to it 
by Member States, it is not only limited to those powers which 
the Member States actually confer, but also to those powers 
which the Member States may legally confer in accordance with 
their national constitutions. This is a distinction of some 
importance, since most national constitutions limit the extent to 
which the Member States may transfer domestic powers to 
international entities.28 One example of this is “national 
identity,” the relinquishment of which is generally prohibited in 
national constitutions.29 Given this limitation, any EU law that 
infringes upon the national identity of such a nation would 
arguably be outside the conferred competences of the EU, as the 
domestic government would not have had the power under their 
own constitutional system to confer such a derogation of identity 
in the first place. In this manner, because the legitimacy of the 
EU relies on the conferral of powers pursuant to the limitations 
of national constitutions, the ultimate validity of EU laws (as 
well as any claim to supremacy) is therefore limited by these 
constitutions as well.30 However, since national courts may not 
 
 26. Beck, supra note 15, at 472. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See Grimm, supra note 2, at 230. 
 29. See id. Although generally acknowledged as impossible to define, this 
term presumably refers to certain basic political and constitutional structures 
or powers underlying sovereignty. 
 30. See Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 191; Michelle Iodice, Solange in Athens, 
32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 539, 541 (2014); Erich Vranes, German Constitutional 
Foundations of, and Limitations to, EU Integration: A Systematic Analysis, 14 
GER. L.J. 75, 109 (2013); Niels Petersen, Karlsruhe Not Only Barks, But Finally 
Bites—Some Remarks on the OMT Decision of the German Constitutional Court, 
15 GER. L.J. 321, 322 (2014). However, it must be noted that this invalidity 
would arguably only occur from the perspective of the national courts enforcing 
domestic law; from the perspective of international law, such disputed treaty 
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declare EU laws invalid, the actual interpretation and 
application of any national limitations on EU competence is still 
left to the ECJ. 
The end result is that the EU not only considers its laws to 
be supreme to both the laws and constitutions of the Member 
States, but also denies the national court systems of the Member 
States any jurisdictional ability to even consider the validity of 
the very EU laws that reign supreme over that legal system. In 
other words, the national courts may very well find themselves 
required to override a legitimate domestic legal norm (or 
constitutional requirement) in favor of an EU law that they 
deem to be illegitimate. As may well be imagined, not every 
national jurisdiction is entirely supportive of this outcome. 
III.  THE GERMAN VISION OF UNION SUPREMACY 
One jurisdiction that has been especially critical of the 
continued development of the EU’s supremacy doctrine as well 
as its claim of Kompetenz-Kompetenz is Germany. It is well 
known that the BVG “has never fully accepted the absolute 
supremacy of the ECJ in matters of EU law.”31 This reticence to 
adhere to the EU’s development of its own comprehensive 
supremacy over national constitutions can be clearly seen and 
best understood in the case law of the BVG. 
A.    THE SOLANGE CASES AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS REVIEW 
The initial case in which the BVG questioned the primacy of 
EU law is Solange I: in that case, the BVG was presented with 
the question of whether an EU law that infringed on 
 
provisions remain valid and binding upon the Member State unless it was 
“objectively evident to any State” involved in the process that the Member State 
lacked the domestic power to agree to that treaty and the internal limitation 
was of “fundamental importance.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
art. 46, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 31. Petersen, supra note 30, at 321; Mayer, supra note 23, at 116; Daniel 
Thym, In the Name of Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon 
Judgment of the German Constitutional Court, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1795, 
1795 (2009); Matthias Niedobitek, The Lisbon Case of 30 June 2009—A 
Comment from the European Law Perspective, 10 GER. L.J. 1267, 1273 (2009). 
See also Andreas Voßkuhle, Multilevel Cooperation of the European 
Constitutional Courts, 6 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 175, 195–96 (2010) (noting that 
“the primacy of Union law . . . is neither absolute nor based on Union law, but 
anchored in national constitutional law, and therefore also limited by it.”). 
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fundamental rights enshrined in the German Basic Law 
(Constitution) did indeed have supremacy over those 
fundamental rights.32 Given that such an EU law, if supreme, 
would be applied in place of the national fundamental rights, 
such a result would leave individuals at the complete mercy of 
the EU legal system for rights protection. The BVG stated that 
since fundamental rights were an inalienable part of the Basic 
Law, the competence to displace or weaken them could not 
legally be transferred to the EU as part of the conferral of 
powers.33 In this sense, the protection of fundamental rights was 
part of the national identity of Germany and could not be 
“surrendered by any legal act.”34 As such, any EU law that 
infringed upon fundamental rights would not be valid, and 
where a conflict occurred between German fundamental rights 
and an EU law, the German rights would prevail.35 This was 
especially the case considering that the BVG determined the 
protection afforded to fundamental rights at the EU level to be 
inadequate.36 The BVG concluded that “so long as” (“solange” in 
German) this inadequate level of protection remained, it would 
exercise its jurisdiction to review EU acts for compatibility with 
the fundamental rights set out in the German Basic Law.37 The 
BVG noted, however, that it would only exercise its jurisdiction 
over an issue where the ECJ had already been asked to interpret 
the EU act in question and the resulting interpretation did not 
 
 32. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] May 29, 1974, 37 BVERFGE 271 (Ger.) [hereinafter Solange I]. 
 33. See Solange I, 37 BVERFGE 271 (280) (Ger.) (“Ein unaufgebbares, zur 
Verfassungsstruktur des Grundgesetzes gehörendes Essentiale der geltenden 
Verfassung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist der Grundrechtsteil des 
Grundgesetzes. Ihn zu relativieren, gestattet Art. 24 GG nicht vorbehaltlos.”). 
 34. Grimm, supra note 7, at 356–57. 
 35. See Solange I, 37 BVERFGE 271 (281) (Ger.) (“Vorläufig entsteht also in 
dem unterstellten Fall einer Kollision von Gemeinschaftsrecht mit einem Teil 
des nationalen Verfassungsrechts, näherhin der grundgesetzlichen 
Grundrechtsgarantien, die Frage, welches Recht vorgeht, das andere also 
verdrängt. In diesem Normenkonflikt setzt sich die Grundrechtsgarantie des 
Grundgesetzes durch, solange nicht entsprechend dem Vertragsmechanismus 
die zuständigen Organe der Gemeinschaft den Normenkonflikt behoben 
haben.”). 
 36. See id., at 280; Anne Peters, The Bananas Decision (2000) of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court: Towards Reconciliation with the 
European Court of Justice as Regards Fundamental Rights Protection in 
Europe, 43 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 276, 278 (2000). 
 37. See Solange I, 37 BVERFGE 271 (285) (Ger.); see also Grimm, supra note 
7, at 356–57; Ming-Sung Kuo, Discovering Sovereignty in Dialogue: Is Judicial 
Dialogue the Answer to Constitutional Conflict in the Pluralist Legal 
Landscape?, 26 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 341, 362 (2013). 
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relieve any conflict between the EU norm and German 
fundamental rights.38 
The ramifications of this decision are not only fairly clear, 
but also rather immense. First, by holding that an EU law would 
not be supreme to a national constitutional provision (however 
important its standing within the domestic legal system), the 
BVG was directly challenging the doctrine of EU supremacy as 
developed by the ECJ. Second, by inserting itself as a legal 
authority capable of reviewing the compatibility of an EU law 
with a national provision, and potentially holding that EU norm 
to be inapplicable within the national system, the BVG was 
explicitly ignoring the ECJ’s ruling that it had the sole authority 
to declare an EU law invalid. These independent assertions 
arose from the basic fact that the BVG viewed the relationship 
between the Member States and the EU in a fundamentally 
different light than the ECJ did, as later cases will show. 
Although there was considerable unease about the BVG’s 
decision, the ECJ proved particularly receptive to the criticism 
that fundamental rights protection was lacking at the EU level 
and set about remedying this deficit.39 Taking inspiration from 
various international instruments, as well as from the “joint 
constitutional heritage of Member States,” the ECJ 
“substantially accelerated the development of its common-law 
type fundamental rights jurisprudence.”40 The end-result of the 
developmental process was that the EU treaties implicitly 
contained an “unwritten Bill of Rights” to which EU laws and 
actions were required to adhere.41 In this manner, the ECJ was 
able to reinforce the continuing supremacy of EU law over 
conflicting national norms,42 since the increased protection of 
fundamental rights never allowed Germany (or any other 
Member State) to entertain a case wherein an EU law was 
inconsistent with the protection of fundamental rights. 
Thus, by developing its fundamental rights jurisprudence, 
the ECJ avoided any potential conflict with the BVG.43 As a 
result of this development, it was never necessary for the BVG 
 
 38. See Solange I, 37 BVERFGE 271 (285); see also Grimm, supra note 7, at 
357. 
 39. See Grimm, supra note 2, at 233; Kuo, supra note 37, at 363. 
 40. Kumm, supra note 4, at 294–95; see also Grimm, supra note 2, at 233; 
Beck, supra note 15, at 489. 
 41. Grimm, supra note 2, at 233. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Beck, supra note 15, at 489. 
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to assert the jurisdiction to review EU laws that it had claimed 
in Solange I. In 1986, the BVG officially put an end to any 
speculation that it eventually would: in what became known as 
Solange II, the BVG examined the ECJ’s increased protection of 
fundamental rights, and declared that they were now 
sufficiently guaranteed at the EU level.44 The Court further 
stated that “so long as” the EU continued to adequately protect 
fundamental rights, then the BVG would no longer exercise its 
jurisdiction to review EU legislation or acts.45 Notably, the BVG 
specifically asserted that the protections afforded at the EU level 
need not be identical in every respect to those guaranteed at the 
national level, as long as they were generally considered to be 
equivalent.46 In doing so, the BVG took away any obligation on 
its part to compare and contrast between the various doctrines 
of fundamental rights protections at each level, effectively 
eliminating any possible necessity to provide exhaustive 
oversight of EU law. 
Although the BVG in Solange II established a legal standard 
that it would essentially no longer review EU acts or legislation, 
it is important to realize that the Court did not expressly 
relinquish its claim that it had the jurisdiction to do so.47 Rather, 
it chose not to exercise this jurisdiction only so long as the EU 
continued to adequately protect fundamental rights.48 Put 
differently, the BVG’s decision maintained the stance that it has 
the power to review EU laws for validity given the limitations of 
national constitutional requirements and that it could reactivate 
this jurisdiction at any time if the EU failed to live up to its end 
of the bargain.49 Thus, the assertions made by the BVG in 
Solange I that the supremacy of EU law is subject to limitations 
imposed by national constitutions, and the BVG’s power to police 
these limitations (both contrary to the ECJ’s established 
jurisprudence), were implicitly sustained. Actions of the BVG 
 
 44. See BVERFG, Oct. 22, 1986, 73 BVERFGE 339 (378), (Ger.) [hereinafter 
Solange II] (“Dieser Grundrechtsstandard ist mittlerweise insbesondere durch 
die Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 
inhaltlich ausgestaltet worden, gefestigt und zureichend gewährleistet.”); see 
also Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 192. 
 45. See Solange II, 73 BVERFGE 339 (381) (Ger.); see also Grimm, supra 
note 7, at 357. 
 46. See Solange II, 73 BVERFGE 339 (381) (Ger.); see also Grimm, supra 
note 2, at 230–31. 
 47. See Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 192; see also Grimm, supra note 2 at 234. 
 48. See Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 192; Grimm, supra note 2, at 234. 
 49. See Grimm, supra note 2, at 235; Iodice, supra note 30, at 543. 
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since Solange II, however, have shown that the reactivation of 
its jurisdiction in this area would likely require a “decisive step 
backwards” in the protection of fundamental rights at the EU 
level.50 Indeed, the standard of proof now required by those 
seeking to engage the Court’s jurisdiction in this area is 
“unanimously regarded in the academic literature as practically 
insurmountable.”51 
B.     THE MAASTRICHT CASE AND THE INITIATION OF ULTRA VIRES   
REVIEW 
In 1993, in what has become known as the Maastricht case, 
the BVG was confronted with a constitutional challenge to 
Germany’s accession to the latest EU Treaty (the Maastricht 
Treaty).52 The BVG’s eventual decision found the applicant’s 
challenges to the Treaty to be without merit, but in doing so, the 
BVG revisited and reinvigorated many of the primacy debates 
that had remained dormant since Solange II.53 
The initial section of the decision concerns admissibility 
standards and, with respect to issues of fundamental rights 
review, effectively reaffirms the Solange line of cases—though 
with a slight twist.54 In Solange I and Solange II, the BVG 
indicated that its jurisdiction to review fundamental rights cases 
involved only those situations where the infringing EU law in 
question was applied by a German institution.55 On the other 
hand, in Maastricht, the BVG clarified that its jurisdiction 
extended to any situation where the application of EU law 
impacted fundamental rights.56 The practical consequences of 
this extension are minimal, since the BVG also reasserted the 
same unattainable standard for the activation of its jurisdiction 
 
 50. Grimm, supra note 2, at 235. 
 51. Vranes, supra note 30, at 104; see Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 192 
(opining that it is “unlikely that this admissibility standard may ever be 
passed”). It is arguable, however, that the admissibility standard in this area 
has been weakened in the recent Data Protection Case, BVERFG, Mar. 2, 2010, 
125 BVERFGE 260 (Ger.) [hereinafter Data Protection Case], though the 
practical impact of that case remains to be seen. 
 52. See BVerfG, Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVERFGE 155 (Ger.) [hereinafter 
Maastricht]. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Solange I, 37 BVERFGE 271 (Ger.); see also Solange II, 73 BVERFGE 
339 (Ger.). 
 56. See Maastricht, 89 BVERFGE 155 (174) (Ger.); see also Grimm, supra 
note 2, at 234. 
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in this area.57 In effect, the BVG expanded a jurisdiction that it 
had already rendered virtually impossible to invoke. However, 
in doing so, the BVG reiterated its theoretical ability to review 
EU legislation. 
The second, and main, part of the Maastricht decision 
focuses on the competences of the EU from the perspective of the 
BVG. The basic assumption of the BVG is that the Member 
States are the “Masters of the Treaties” in the sense that the 
Member States control the EU and not the other way around.58 
As such, the validity of EU law in Germany arises from the 
national legislative acts that create and govern its application 
within the domestic legal system.59 The natural consequence of 
this understanding of the relationship between the EU and the 
Member States is that EU law may be considered supreme when 
it comes into conflict with incompatible domestic norms, but this 
supremacy exists only because the national legislation 
governing EU law makes it supreme.60 In other words, it is a 
supremacy over the domestic laws that is entirely dependent on 
those domestic laws. The end effect is that national laws are only 
subsidiary on a voluntary basis. 
The conception that the EU is a product of the Member 
States also results in a fundamental shift as to the definition of 
EU competences. As a starting point in Maastricht, the BVG 
went to great lengths to disprove the notion that the EU had the 
power to decide the limitations of its own competence 
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz).61 The restrictions set around the 
conferred powers are those established by the Member States, 
and the EU does not possess an exclusive position when it comes 
to their definition. Taking this line of reasoning a step further, 
the BVG stated that it, as a national domestic court, also had the 
power to review EU competences.62 From the BVG’s point of 
view, since the EU is limited to only those powers specifically 
conferred upon it, any EU actions beyond those powers would 
 
 57. See Grimm, supra note 2, at 234–35. 
 58. Maastricht, 89 BVERFGE 155 (190) (Ger.) (“Deutschland ist einer der 
‘Herren der Verträge.’”); see also Julio Baquero Cruz, The Legacy of the 
Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement, 14 EUR. L.J. 389, 392 (2008). 
 59. See Maastricht, 89 BVERFGE 155 (190) (Ger.). 
 60. See id.; Grimm, supra note 7, at 355. 
 61. See Maastricht, 89 BVERFGE 155 (195–97) (Ger.). 
 62. See id. at 188 (“Dementsprechend prüft das Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
ob Rechtsakte der europäischen Einrichtungen und Organe sich in den Grenzen 
der ihnen eingeräumten Hoheitsrechte halten oder aus ihnen ausbrechen.”). 
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not be binding within Germany.63 This is true not only of EU 
laws or other secondary legislation, but also where judicial 
interpretation of the EU Treaty effectively expands the Treaty 
outside the limitations specifically imposed by the Member 
States.64 Thus, in Maastricht, the BVG not only asserted that 
EU power is limited by the national constitutions and the 
conferred powers within the EU Treaty, but also that the 
Member States have the right to police and invalidate any ultra 
vires acts taken by the EU.65 Naturally, these doctrines fly 
directly in the face of established EU jurisprudence.66 
The Maastricht decision was not well received by academics 
or practitioners.67 However, similar to the aftermath of Solange 
I, the reaction at the EU level appeared fairly mute. Rather than 
directly combatting the challenge to its jurisdiction, the ECJ 
instead “began to act much more cautiously in cases related to 
Community powers.”68 By tightening its case law with respect to 
EU competences, and limiting the liberalness of its interpretive 
doctrines, the ECJ, in effect, began to self-police EU actions. 
Similar to its response to Solange I, the ECJ’s actions post-
Maastricht effectively reduced the opportunities for conflict 
between itself and the BVG, rather than seek them out.69 It 
should be noted, though, that numerous scholars argue that the 
ECJ’s actions were not taken in response to the BVG, but rather 
were arrived at independently.70 Although the validity of the 
cause and effect in this instance can never be authoritatively 
established, at a minimum, the timing of the ECJ’s shifting 
jurisprudence is suspicious. 
 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. at 157; Cruz, supra note 58, at 392. 
 65. See Bast, supra note 23, at 170; Elisabetta Lanza, Core of State 
Sovereignty and Boundaries of European Union’s Identity in the Lissabon-
Urteil, 11 GER. L.J. 399, 411 (2010); Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 193; Franz C. 
Mayer, The European Constitution and the Courts: Adjudicating European 
Constitutional Law in a Multilevel System 13 (Monnet Working Paper No. 9/03, 
2003), http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/ archive/papers/03/030901-03.pdf. 
 66. See Beck, supra note 15, at 472. 
 67. See JHR & LB, On the Lissabon-Urteil: Democracy and a Democratic 
Paradox, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 341, 344 (2009); Grimm, supra note 2, at 237. 
 68. Cruz, supra note 58, at 404; accord Kumm, supra note 4, at 296; 
Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 195. 
 69. See Cruz, supra note 58, at 404. 
 70. Id. 
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C.    THE LISBON DECISION AND IDENTITY REVIEW 
For its part, post-Maastricht, the BVG also appeared to be 
in no hurry to provoke an incident with the ECJ. Having sent a 
“clear message” to the ECJ and the EU institutions generally,71 
the BVG failed to follow through with its threat to invalidate EU 
legislation in any of its subsequent cases.72 In this respect, the 
Court actively avoided direct and open conflict with the ECJ over 
these issues. Some commentators believed the BVG became “all 
bark and no bite.”73 As such, the aggressive expansion of the 
Lisbon decision of 2009 came as somewhat of a surprise to 
many.74 
In Lisbon, the BVG upheld the constitutional compatibility 
of the new Lisbon EU Treaty with the German Basic Law, while 
striking down the domestic implementation of that Treaty.75 
Though, similar to Maastricht, it was not so much the ultimate 
outcome of the constitutional challenge that proved especially 
important, rather it was the language and reasoning the BVG 
applied in doing so. The BVG’s discussion of the Treaty in 
relation to the limitations of Germany’s Basic Law proved highly 
significant in several specific aspects surrounding Germany’s 
legal relationship with the EU.76 
First, the BVG reiterated and clarified many of its positions 
from Maastricht. Specifically, Lisbon reaffirmed that the 
Member States remained the “Masters of the Treaties” and the 
ultimate source of the EU’s power.77 As such, any primacy of EU 
law over domestic law is derived from the Basic Law rather than 
the autonomous supremacy of the Treaty.78 Furthermore, the 
EU may only act within those powers that have been conferred 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Beck, supra note 15, at 486; Cruz, supra note 58, at 395–96; Frank 
Schorkopf, The European Union as an Association of Sovereign States: 
Karlsruhe’s Ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon, 10 GER. L.J. 1219 (2009). 
 73. Cruz, supra note 58, at 395; see, e.g., Christoph U. Schmid, All Bark 
and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court’s “Banana Decision,” 7 
EUR. L.J. 95 (2001). 
 74. See Schorkopf, supra note 72, at 1219. 
 75. See Frank Schorkopf, German Federal Constitutional Court Opinion on 
the Compatibility of the EU Lisbon Treaty with the German Basic Law, 104 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 259 (2010) [hereinafter Schorkopf Lisbon]. 
 76. See id. at 260. 
 77. See BVERFG, Jun. 30, 2009, 123 BVERFGE 267, § 231 (Ger.) [hereinafter 
Lisbon]; see also Roland Bieber, An Association of Sovereign States, 5 EUR. 
CONST. L. REV. 391, 397 (2009). 
 78. See 123 BVERFGE 267 (§ 240) (Ger.). 
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upon it, and the BVG reasserted its jurisdiction to consider 
whether EU acts are ultra vires.79 Moreover, the Court expanded 
this jurisdiction by clearly stating that, in addition to policing 
EU actions for conformity with conferred powers, it would 
provide oversight to ensure the EU’s adherence to the principle 
of subsidiarity.80 Finally, the BVG reasserted its understanding 
that the EU lacks jurisdiction to rule on its own competence 
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz).81 
However, the BVG did more in Lisbon than simply repeat 
and further entrench its prior views on the legal relationship 
between the EU and Germany; it expanded them as well. When 
discussing the basic limitations imposed upon the Lisbon Treaty 
by the German Basic Law, the BVG noted that the German 
legislature’s constitutional abilities to transfer sovereign powers 
to the EU “are granted under the condition that the sovereign 
statehood of a constitutional state is maintained on the basis of 
an integration programme according to the principle of conferral 
and respecting the Member States’ constitutional identity.”82 
Thus, not only is the EU limited to the use of those powers that 
have been specifically conferred to it by the Member State, but 
it also may not exercise conferred powers that the Member State 
was constitutionally unable to transfer.83 In Germany’s case, 
this encompasses those aspects of its “non-transferable identity” 
that are safeguarded under Article 79(3) German Basic Law.84 
The BVG in Lisbon states that this includes decisions as to: 
[S]ubstantive and formal criminal law . . . the disposition 
of the monopoly on the use of force by the police within 
the state and by the military towards the exterior . . . 
fundamental fiscal decisions on public revenue and 
 
 79. See id.; see also Schorkopf, supra note 72, at 1227–28; Vranes, supra 
note 30, at 93; Grimm, supra note 7, at 363; JHR, supra note 67, at 341. 
 80. See 123 BVERFGE 267 (§ 240) (Ger.); Consolidated EU Treaty, supra 
note 22, at 18 (defining the principle of subsidiarity as such that “in areas which 
do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and 
insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States, either at the central level or at regional and local level, 
but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level.”); see also Schorkopf, supra note 67, at 1231. 
 81. See 123 BVERFGE 267 (§ 322) (Ger.). 
 82. Id. § 226. 
 83. See Vranes, supra note 30, at 93. 
 84. See 123 BVERFGE 267 (§ 235) (Ger.); Stefan Theil, What Red Lines, If 
Any, Do the Lisbon Judgments of European Constitutional Courts Draw for 
Future EU Integration?, 15 GER. L.J. 599, 610 (2014). 
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public expenditure . . . decisions on the shaping of living 
conditions in a social state . . . and decisions of particular 
cultural importance.85 
The Court goes into great detail in the decision as to the 
specific aspects that are off-limits to European integration and 
restates that “substantial freedom of action must remain 
reserved to the Member States” in these areas.86 In line with its 
prior assertion of jurisdiction to provide ultra vires review, the 
BVG also asserted in Lisbon the jurisdiction to assess whether 
EU actions infringe upon the national constitutional identity of 
Germany and invalidate any such actions that do.87 
Understandably, Lisbon was not welcomed with immediate 
approval.88 This is unsurprising, given the decision was simply 
another in a “long line of precedents” that had also previously 
been subjected to harsh critique.89 The reaffirmation of the 
reasoning in these prior cases, and the expansion into other 
areas of review, acted to further entrench the BVG’s long-held 
conception of the legal relationship between Germany and the 
EU. 
However, Lisbon, while relying on the BVG’s prior cases, 
shifted the BVG’s emphasis by focusing more on German 
sovereignty.90 This shift may be seen quite clearly in the 
drastically increased usage of the German root word “souverän” 
(forty-nine times) in the judgment as compared to prior usage in 
Maastricht (eight times) and the Solange cases (zero times).91 
Far from a simple linguistic change, the alteration in focus to 
Member State sovereignty made the decision less about the 
limitations on the EU as required by the Treaty, and more about 
 
 85. 123 BVERFGE 267 (§ 252) (Ger.); see also Theil, supra note 84, at 610; 
Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, Identity Trumps Integration: The Lisbon Treaty in 
the German Federal Constitutional Court, 48 DER STAAT 517, 521 (2009); Thym, 
supra note 31, at 1800; Christian Tomuschat, The Ruling of the German 
Constitutional Court on the Treaty of Lisbon, 10 GER. L.J. 1259, 1260 (2009). 
 86. 123 BVERFGE 267 (§ 253) (Ger.); see also (§§ 252–60). 
 87. See id. § 240. 
 88. See JHR, supra note 67, at 343; Joseph H. Weiler, The ‘Lisbon Urteil’ 
and the Fast Food Culture, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 505 (2009); Anna-Bettina Kaiser, 
German Federal Constitutional Court: German Data Retention Provisions 
Unconstitutional in Their Present Form, 6 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 503, 507 (2010); 
Alfred Grosser, The Federal Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Case: Germany’s 
“Sonderweg”—An Outsider’s Perspective, 10 GER. L.J. 1263 (2009). 
 89. Grimm, supra note 7, at 353. 
 90. See id. at 364. 
 91. See Murkens, supra note 85, at 520–21. 
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the restrictions imposed on the EU by the constitutional orders 
of Member States themselves. Thus, whereas Maastricht spoke 
of the EU acting beyond its treaty-defined powers (ultra vires), 
Lisbon spoke of the EU acting beyond the powers the Members 
States could constitutionally confer (identity review).92 
In this respect, Lisbon is a throwback to the line of thinking 
apparent in Solange I, where even though the term 
“souveränität” is not mentioned by name, the fundamental 
rights limitation imposed upon the EU by the BVG was an 
external restriction arising from an inalienable aspect of 
Germany’s constitutional identity.93 In many respects, Lisbon’s 
increased focus on protecting Germany’s sovereignty from EU 
encroachment was viewed as the BVG setting concrete 
limitations on the future integration of the EU.94 From a 
practical standpoint, however, these restrictions were viewed 
with some skepticism: since the BVG had in prior cases 
continuously failed to invoke its jurisdiction over EU affairs, 
there was some doubt as to whether it would actually enforce 
these limitations in the future either.95 
Despite the possible lack of a practical usage, the difficulties 
inherent in a limitation of the EU dependent on national identity 
are numerous and fairly apparent. For one thing, the concept of 
‘identity’ itself is exceedingly difficult to quantify and define: the 
Dutch scholar Kossmann has made the analogy to a “big jellyfish 
on the beach” which, after careful consideration, should be left 
alone, since it is “too complicated, too multifaceted and too 
variable.”96 The malleability of this term also leaves it open to 
abuse by national courts.97 Indeed, the BVG’s definition as to 
what comprises national identity has become rather “elaborate” 
and “expansive.”98 Naturally, the more expansive the definition, 
 
 92. Grimm, supra note 7, at 365. 
 93. See id. at 364; 37 BVERFGE 271 (280) (Ger.) (“Ein unaufgebbares, zur 
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 94. See Thym, supra note 31, at 1808; JHR, supra note 67, at 342. 
 95. See Schorkopf, supra note 72, at 1239; Henning Deters, National 
Constitutional Jurisprudence in a Post-National Europe: The ESM Ruling of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court and the Disavowal of Conflict, 20 EUR. 
L.J. 204, 213 (2014). 
 96. Jan-Herman Reestman, The Franco-German Constitutional Divide, 5 
EUR. CONST. L. REV. 374 (2009). 
 97. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 133. 
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the more protection national laws and rights are afforded with 
respect to EU encroachment. Of course, the resulting protection 
also necessarily shields idiosyncratic national laws from 
superseding EU regulations, which in turn hinders the 
uniformity of the EU legal landscape. 
Since a Member State’s national identity is determined by 
its domestic legal system, every national system will define its 
identity differently based upon its own internal prerogatives, 
further undermining consistency in the EU area.99 This is in 
stark contrast to ultra vires review, where every national system 
would interpret and apply the same articles of the EU Treaty in 
a presumably similar manner.100 Thus, identity review yields a 
greater risk of legal inconsistencies among the EU Member 
States, which, given the importance placed by the ECJ upon the 
uniform interpretation and application of EU laws, would likely 
provide a fertile ground for conflict between the ECJ and 
national courts, specifically the BVG.101 
D.    THE HONEYWELL CASE AND ULTRA VIRES REVIEW 
Any doubt as to whether the BVG would actually invoke its 
jurisdiction to examine the validity of an EU act was, in some 
respects, both silenced and amplified by the BVG’s Honeywell 
case of 2010. In Honeywell, the BVG was presented with its first 
real opportunity after Lisbon to review an EU act, and it did so, 
albeit tentatively.102 In doing so, the BVG reiterated that it was 
“empowered and obliged” to review the validity of EU acts.103 As 
such, the BVG invoked its ultra vires jurisdiction and explicitly 
clarified the conditions under which it would hold an EU law to 
be outside the powers of the EU.104 The end result was that 
 
1417, 1438–39 (2011). 
 99. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 133; Thym, supra note 31, at 1806. 
 100. See Thym, supra note 31, at 1806. However, Thym also argues later 
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 101. See id. at 1805. 
 102. See Matthias Mahlmann, The Politics of Constitutional Identity and its 
Legal Frame—the Ultra Vires Decision of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court, 11 GER. L.J. 1407, 1409 (2010); Theil, supra note 84, at 627. 
 103. BVERFG, July 6, 2010, 126 BVERFGE 286 (§ 55) (Ger.), 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocts/Entscheidungen/EN/20
10/07/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) [hereinafter 
Honeywell]. 
 104. See Mahlmann, supra note 102, at 1410. 
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under the clarified standard set out by the BVG, the EU action 
in Honeywell was not found to be ultra vires.105 Thus, the BVG 
silenced some critics by actually invoking its jurisdiction over 
EU acts, but emboldened others by not actually following 
through with its threats to limit the EU. 
The real importance of Honeywell, though, lies in the 
standard enunciated by the BVG as to when it would actually 
hold an EU act ultra vires. As an initial procedural hurdle, the 
BVG stated that the ECJ must have first had the opportunity to 
“deliver its legal opinion by means of a preliminary ruling.”106 As 
such, the BVG will not invalidate an EU action unless the ECJ 
itself has specifically failed to act in that regard.107 From a 
substantive standpoint, the BVG clarified that only those EU 
acts that are “manifestly” beyond the “transferred competences” 
and “highly significant in the structure of competences between 
the Member States and the Union with regard to the principle of 
conferral and to the binding nature of the statute under the rule 
of law” will be considered ultra vires.108 Finally, from a purely 
practical standpoint, the ECJ is entitled to a “tolerance of 
error,”109 such that isolated cases of error may not give rise to 
ultra vires actions.110 
The cumulative effect of these standards lends some 
credence to the critiques of the BVG, in that, although Honeywell 
makes the invocation of the Court’s ultra vires jurisdiction very 
possible (as evidenced by its usage in Honeywell itself), given the 
deferential language employed by the BVG, the most likely 
outcome is that the EU act will be upheld.111 For one thing, the 
requirement of a manifest transgression of EU competences that 
has purposefully not been remedied by the ECJ when given the 
chance is a hurdle of such magnitude that it is likely never to 
occur.112 Given that most structural change within the EU 
integration process has occurred incrementally or piecemeal, it 
 
 105. See Honeywell, 126 BVERFGE 286 (§ 68) (Ger.). 
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 108. Honeywell, 126 BVERFGE 286 (§ 61)(Ger.). 
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is even more unlikely that a major structural shift in the 
competences between the Member States and the EU would 
even exist, much less be attributable to an actual manifest act 
by the EU itself.113 Thus, the Honeywell requirements for a 
successful ultra vires appeal appear very similar in their 
impracticality to the standards for a fundamental rights appeal 
set out in Solange II (a standard that has yet to successfully be 
met).114 
There are legitimate reasons for the inaccessibility of this 
standard, though. First and perhaps foremost, the difficulty in 
achieving the criteria reveals the BVG’s unease itself with 
national courts actually having the ability to hold EU acts 
invalid.115 Therefore, an ultra vires holding should be a rare 
measure of last resort and the seeming impossibility of the 
Honeywell standard reflects this. In addition, the requirement 
that an ultra vires act be manifest makes the determination of 
such an act fairly straightforward—an ‘obvious’ transgression of 
powers should be easy to identify and uncontroversial.116 This in 
turn removes any uncertainty over the ultimate actions of the 
BVG, since the invalidation of such a manifest misstep on the 
part of the EU would be beyond reproach from most quarters.117 
Providing additional deference to the ECJ in its decisions serves 
the same purpose.118 Also, only an obvious and highly significant 
ultra vires EU act would cause enough damage on its own to 
justify the extensive injury to the EU legal system that an ultra 
vires holding itself would cause.119 In other words, an ultra vires 
holding would likely be a pyrrhic victory, and only justifiable 
where the EU was already far along in burning itself to the 
ground anyway. 
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E.    THE OMT DECISION AND THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
That, at least, was the conventional opinion. In its latest 
decision from January 2014, however, with respect to the 
Outright Monetary Transactions program (litigation that is still 
ongoing at the time of this Article), the BVG expressed an 
unexpected willingness to potentially set the entire system on 
fire.120 In the OMT decision, the BVG was directly confronted 
with the rather complicated mechanisms meant to quell the 
European financial crisis.121 In an earlier 2012 case, the BVG 
had ruled that Germany was allowed to participate in the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which provided “loans 
and other financial assistance to states in trouble,” only so long 
as the German Parliament retained extensive control over ESM 
actions.122 Contemporaneous with the 2012 decision, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) issued a public statement 
pledging to prop up troubled Eurozone States by buying their 
bonds on the secondary market; this was known as the Outright 
Monetary Transactions program (OMT).123 In essence, the OMT 
was meant to serve the same purpose as the ESM: to stabilize 
the bond market sufficiently to relieve pressure on the distressed 
States.124 The ECB press release about the OMT alone 
accomplished this feat, without any actual monetary actions 
being necessary.125 However, from the point of view of the BVG, 
the question in the OMT case was whether Germany was 
allowed to participate in such a program given that the 
parliamentary controls necessary for its participation in the 
similar ESM were entirely lacking in the OMT scheme.126 
Surprisingly, the BVG broke new ground in OMT—it 
submitted the first preliminary reference127 in its history to the 
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ECJ as to the OMT program and its compatibility with the 
European treaties.128 Considering that the Honeywell standard 
requires that the ECJ be given first pass at ruling on the validity 
of any potential ultra vires EU action, the BVG’s preliminary 
reference as to the legality of the ECB’s actions was necessary.129 
It is important to note, however, that the BVG did not refer any 
questions concerning possible conflicts with the constitutional 
identity of Germany; in fact, it hinted rather strongly that 
identity review would not require a prior ruling by the ECJ.130 
Even more interesting, though, is that instead of waiting for the 
ECJ to definitively answer its ultra vires questions, the BVG 
presented an extensive, preliminary answer of its own.131 
The BVG opined fairly strongly that the OMT program was 
an ultra vires act and would be inapplicable in Germany.132 In 
other words, instead of taking the path of least resistance and 
deferring the issue to the ECJ until it became absolutely 
necessary to confront what it considered to be an ultra vires act 
on the part of the EU (a course of action that would align nicely 
with the Court’s historical reluctance to actually rule on the 
validity of EU actions), the BVG instead went out of its way to 
speak out on the merits of the issue. That it then found the EU 
act to be ultra vires was perhaps even more shocking. Of course, 
the BVG did not legally hold the OMT to be ultra vires in the 
decision. Rather, it stated that it considered the OMT to be 
invalid under its present interpretation of EU law, but left open 
whether the ECJ’s interpretation of that law or the OMT itself 
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might in some way save the validity of the program.133 
In its extensive discussion of the issue, however, the BVG 
provided a small glimpse into the actual workings of ultra vires 
review according to the Honeywell standard. Far from being 
impossible to reach, OMT offers evidence that the ‘manifest’ 
standard depends largely on the clear textual commitment of 
powers within the EU Treaty. For instance, when discussing 
whether the ECB’s actions would be manifest, the BVG placed 
great emphasis on the fact that such actions would affect the 
economic policy of the Member States, the responsibility for 
which “lies clearly with the Member States.”134 Likewise, the 
BVG invoked the idea of a clear demarcation of powers later 
when noting that the OMT would potentially violate an “explicit 
prohibition of monetary financing of the budget.”135 Thus, a 
manifest violation can arise where the EU acts in areas that are 
clearly or explicitly within the domain of the Member States. 
Furthermore, OMT sheds light on a potential realignment 
of competences as well. In the decision, the BVG noted that the 
ECB’s actions would be “structurally significant” because they 
would “lead to a considerable redistribution between the budgets 
and the taxpayers of the Member States,” areas which “belong 
to the core aspects of the Member States’ economic policy 
responsibilities.”136 To summarize, it would appear from OMT 
that the Honeywell standard would be satisfied where an EU act 
violates a core area of Member State responsibility that is clearly 
demarcated as such in the EU treaties. In other words, as 
evidenced by OMT itself, the Honeywell standard is neither 
impossible nor perhaps even that difficult to satisfy.137 
The practical accessibility of the BVG’s ultra vires standard 
implied in OMT, and the BVG’s apparent willingness to use it, 
may represent a significant problem going forward given the 
ECJ’s recent decision on the OMT referral. In Gauweiler, while 
steering clear of any consideration (or even mention) of the 
BVG’s assertion of ultra vires jurisdiction, the ECJ effectively 
disagreed with the BVG’s assessment as to the validity of the 
OMT program, ruling instead that it was entirely within the 
competence of the EU to create such a program.138 
 
 133. See id. §§ 99–100. 
 134. See id. § 39. 
 135. See id. § 43. 
 136. See id. §§ 40–41. 
 137. See Bast, supra note 23, at 178–79. 
 138. See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler et al. v. Deutscher Bundestag (E.C.J. June 
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In other words, the ECJ sent the case back to the BVG for 
further consideration having ignored the German court’s 
concerns as to the existence of an ultra vires act, thereby 
effectively fulfilling the “failure to act” component necessary 
under Honeywell for the eventual invalidation of an EU law by 
the BVG. Put more casually, if the preliminary referral in OMT 
evidenced an unexpected desire on the part of the BVG to set the 
entire system on fire by actually declaring an EU act ultra vires, 
the ECJ in Gauweiler appeared completely content to drop off 
matches and lighter fluid at the front door of the Federal 
Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
 
The evolution of the BVG’s case law with respect to the legal 
relationship between Germany and the EU is one of fits and 
starts, threats and accommodations. In Solange I, the BVG 
introduced the concept that the ECJ’s proclaimed supremacy of 
EU law over conflicting domestic norms might not be so ironclad, 
holding that EU acts must give way where they violate national 
fundamental rights. Moreover, the BVG stated that, despite the 
ECJ’s assertion of exclusive authority to review the validity of 
EU laws, national courts were entitled to consider the legality of 
EU acts as well. However, the BVG never actually invalidated 
an EU act on these grounds and in the intervening years, the 
ECJ implemented fundamental rights norms into EU law to an 
extent that the BVG eventually voluntarily set aside its 
fundamental rights jurisdiction over EU acts in Solange II. 
In Maastricht, though, the BVG reasserted its opinion that 
EU laws did not necessarily have primacy over national norms 
in holding that any EU acts outside the conferred competences 
of the EU set out in the constituent treaties would be held invalid 
by the BVG. This decision arose from the BVG’s viewpoint that 
the Member States were the masters of the treaties and that EU 
law was only supreme because the national legal systems 
established it as such through their own domestic norms. 
 
16, 2015) (not yet published) § 127, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=165057&pageIndex=0&doclang= EN&mode=lst&
dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=159426 [hereinafter Gauweiler] (“In view of all the 
foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that Articles 
119 TFEU, 123(1) TFEU and 127(1) and (2) TFEU and Articles 17 to 24 of the 
Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB must be interpreted as permitting the ESCB 
to adopt a programme for the purchase of government bonds on secondary 
markets, such as the programme announced in the press release.”). 
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Following upon this conception of the EU, the BVG in Maastricht 
likewise asserted that the EU was limited to those powers 
conferred upon it by the EU treaties and that it therefore lacked 
the exclusive authority to define its own competences 
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz). Finally, the BVG itself not only 
retained this authority but was obliged to police the actions of 
the EU for validity. The ECJ took Maastricht in stride and 
arguably became more conservative in its interpretive approach 
to the competences of the EU as a result. For its part, the BVG 
never invoked its ultra vires jurisdiction, thereby creating an 
uneasy truce between the two judicial bodies. 
Lisbon, however, marked the beginning of the next phase. 
In this case, the BVG took its line of reasoning one step further, 
holding that not only was the EU limited to those powers that 
had been conferred upon it in the EU treaties, but that the EU 
was also restricted from exercising powers that the Member 
States could not have legally transferred to it under their own 
national constitutions. With regard to Germany, this included 
any powers that would transgress the constitutional identity of 
the nation. The BVG went to great lengths to set out examples 
of domestic areas that were beyond the competence of the EU. 
Shortly thereafter, the BVG took the opportunity in Honeywell 
to clarify the standards for a successful ultra vires review, 
requiring that the ECJ be given a first pass at the issue, and that 
only a “manifest transgression”139 of the “transferred 
competences” that was “highly significant in the structure of 
competences” between the EU and the Member States would 
constitute an ultra vires act. With the pronouncement of such a 
high standard, it appeared to be making the assertions of Lisbon 
less practically effective. Yet, shortly thereafter, in the OMT 
decision, the BVG clearly indicated that the Honeywell standard 
could be met, and indeed specifically stated that it considered 
the OMT program to be ultra vires, since it was an EU act that 
transgressed a core area that was clearly left to the Member 
States in the EU treaties. The ECJ’s decision in Gauweiler that 
the OMT program was within the competence of the EU creates 
a genuine conflict with the BVG as to the ultra vires issue. 
IV.  ANALYSIS AND PREDICTIONS 
As can be seen from this recap of the BVG’s most significant 
 
 139. See Honeywell, supra note 103, §§ 55–61. 
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case law, the legal relationship—from BVG’s vantage point—
between the EU and Germany has evolved considerably over 
time. What remains to be considered is the current status of that 
relationship—from both courts’ point of view—and where it is 
currently headed. In this regard, there are several aspects that 
must be examined. 
 
A.    BASIC CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES 
 
As illustrated supra, the ECJ and the BVG disagree on a 
variety of significant aspects concerning the relationship 
between the Member States and the EU. These differences 
largely stem from a basic conceptual difference in how the BVG 
and the EU view that relationship. From the ECJ’s perspective, 
the EU legal system is autonomous.140 It derives from its own 
sources and is independent of the Member States and their 
national law.141 As such, it is “self-referential and therefore 
constitutional [in] nature.”142 Given this character, its primacy 
over national law is self-explanatory and exists without 
reference to national legal systems.143 Furthermore, since the 
EU legal system is self-referential and requires absolute 
uniformity, it is the natural conclusion that a single court would 
have the ultimate and exclusive ability to define and regulate 
the boundaries of that system. The ECJ has claimed this role, 
and with it the jurisdiction to determine the competences of the 
EU as a whole (Kompetenz-Kompetenz).144 Pursuant to this 
responsibility, the ECJ has become a “motor” of European 
integration and has often “complemented and further developed” 
the often fragmentary landscape of EU law through “dynamic” 
interpretation.145 As such, from the conceptual viewpoint of the 
 
 140. See Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 586, supra note 5. 
 141. See Iodice, supra note 30, at 541; see also Barents, supra note 2, at 423–
24 (“Therefore, all national authorities are obliged to apply EU law in all 
situations falling within its scope, irrespective of the status, contents and form 
of conflicting national rules. It does not matter whether the conflicting national 
rules were adopted prior to or after the rule of EU law concerned.”). 
 142. Barents, supra note 2, at 431. 
 143. See id. at 423–24. 
 144. See Beck, supra note 15, at 472–73; see also Grimm, supra note 2, at 
236 (“Within the European Community there is an institution whose special 
task is to determine whether or not organs of the Community have violated the 
Treaties—the ECJ. On the Community level, therefore, the question of 
competence is clear: if the ECJ concludes that a measure meets all Treaty 
requirements, then the boundary has not been violated.”). 
 145. Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 182. 
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ECJ, the Member States created an EU where the legal system 
is both independent of, and dominant over, the national legal 
systems. 
The BVG’s conceptual perspective obviously differs rather 
substantially. From the BVG precedent examined supra, it is 
quite clear that the EU legal system is not considered to be 
absolutely autonomous and independent, but rather dependent 
upon the national legal systems for its authority.146 The Member 
States, far from creating a self-referential and independent EU, 
are the masters of the treaties and EU law only has primacy 
through the voluntary assent of the national implementing 
legislation, which may be removed at any time.147 As a result, 
EU law is only above national law to the extent and within the 
parameters considered permissible by the domestic legal 
system.148 The BVG concludes that since the supremacy of EU 
law is a manifestation of and is controlled by the national legal 
system, that system would be allowed to provide some oversight 
with respect to those laws.149 Likewise, to allow the EU itself to 
have unlimited reign to determine its own competences would 
render national limitations irrelevant. Thus, the BVG has held 
very firmly that the ECJ does not possess Kompetenz-
Kompetenz.150 Nor has the BVG been particularly welcoming to 
the concept of “dynamic interpretation,” since such liberal 
interpretation might serve to extend the competence of the EU 
beyond what the Member States specifically conferred in the 
founding treaties.151 Consequently, from the BVG’s perspective, 
 
 146. See Cruz, supra note 58, at 392; see also Honeywell, supra note 103, § 55 
(showing the BVG refers to EU law as autonomous, but in the same sentence 
also affirms that it remains “dependent on assignment and empowerment in a 
Treaty” of which the Member States are in complete control). 
 147. Maastricht, supra note 52, § 112 (“Deutschland ist einer der ‘Herren der 
Verträge.’”); see also Cruz, supra note 58, at 392 (explaining how “Germany is 
one of the ‘Masters of the Treaties’ and may withdraw from the EU unilaterally 
at any time” and that “[c]ommunity law is not autonomous: its validity in 
Germany depends upon the act of accession (the ‘order to give legal application’ 
or Rechtsanwendungsbefehl) and ultimately upon the German Constitution.”). 
 148. See Grimm, supra note 7, at 356. 
 149. See Mayer, supra note 65, at 14. 
 150. See Maastricht, supra note 52, § 123–29. 
 151. See id. §§ 31–32 (“Thus interpretation of such standards may not have 
an effect equivalent to an extension of the Treaty; indeed, if standards of 
competence were interpreted in this way, such interpretation would not have 
any binding effect on Germany.”); see also Lisbon, supra note 77, § 238 (“If in 
the process of European integration primary law is amended, or expansively 
interpreted by institutions, a constitutionally important tension will arise with 
the principle of conferral and with the individual Member State’s constitutional 
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the Member States retain ultimate control over the EU and its 
legal system. 
Contrasting these divergent conceptual viewpoints, it can 
easily be seen how the two legal systems have developed in 
entirely different directions: they both view their respective legal 
order to have primacy over the other and their individual 
holdings reflect those beliefs. That the case law and legal norms 
of the BVG and the ECJ have become so contradictory creates 
an ongoing potential for conflict whenever the two legal orders 
come into contact.152 Furthermore, since neither the BVG nor 
the ECJ appear willing to forfeit their claim to primacy any time 
in the near future, this overt disagreement will not likely go 
away on its own. 
Yet, until OMT and Gauweiler, the BVG and ECJ have 
generally managed to avoid open battles for nearly forty years. 
This, in and of itself, has been a triumph of sorts, given that the 
consequences of such a public clash between the courts over the 
primacy/jurisdictional question would be catastrophic to the 
practical continuance of the EU.153 That such a fate has been 
avoided this long owes perhaps just as much to the pragmatism 
of the two courts, though, as to any fear they may harbor 
concerning the magnitude of such a conflict.154 
B.  AGREEING TO DISAGREE 
Despite their differences in opinion about the conceptual 
basis of the EU, both the ECJ and the BVG have shown a 
pragmatic ability to cooperate when necessary.155 Given the 
intertwined nature of the EU and national legal systems, it is 
not surprising that the two systems (and the courts within) exert 
some influence over each other on substantive and procedural 
 
responsibility for integration.”). 
 152. See Cruz, supra note 58, at 418. 
 153. See Mahlmann, supra note 102, at 1414; see also Mayer, supra note 23, 
at 133 (“Establishing national identity and national constitutional identity as a 
limit of EU law unilaterally is extremely dangerous for legal unity in the EU 
and open to abuse.”); see also Bieber, supra note 77, at 405 (“How damaging 
such claims for unilateral action within a united system of decision-making are, 
has already been stated by the European Court of Justice . . . .”). 
 154. See Beck, supra note 15, at 493. 
 155. See Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 189 (“[T]he relationship between the 
Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court is not about superiority 
or subordination but about appropriately sharing and assigning responsibilities 
in a complex multilevel system.”). 
2016] AGREEING TO DISAGREE 155 
issues.156 With specific reference to the BVG and the ECJ, this 
back and forth influence has at times been described as a form 
of judicial ‘dialogue,’ wherein the rulings of each court signal to 
the other their specific intentions.157 This serves to both avoid 
possible conflicts as well as pave the way to potential resolutions 
where those conflicts already exist.158 This dialogue, at times, 
has come to resemble a bit of a dance, with one partner 
gracefully leading the other around any potential legal pitfalls 
in their relationship. This can readily be seen in the cases 
examined supra. 
Starting with Solange I, the BVG expressed its concern 
about the fundamental rights protection afforded under EU law. 
It also introduced the idea that national courts could deny the 
application of EU law where adequate protection was not 
provided at the EU level.159 Thus alerted to the potential 
problem, the ECJ reacted by ensuring the protection of 
fundamental rights at the EU level.160 Its fears allayed, the BVG 
responded in Solange II by voluntarily foregoing fundamental 
rights jurisdiction over EU law so long as EU protections 
remained sufficient.161 Arguably, a similar dynamic took place 
with respect to EU competences: in Maastricht, the BVG 
signaled its intent to provide oversight in this area through ultra 
vires review, and subsequently, the ECJ took more care in its 
interpretation of EU competences.162 The fact that the BVG 
waited seventeen years before actually exercising its asserted 
ultra vires jurisdiction in Honeywell, and in doing so propagated 
a review standard considered virtually impossible to meet,163 
might be interpreted similarly to Solange II, as a voluntary 
suspension of an asserted, but controversial, jurisdiction. 
This warning and response pattern (BVG jurisdictional 
 
 156. See Barents, supra note 2, at 440; Voßkuhle, supra note 2, at 181–82; 
Theil, supra note 84, at 633. 
 157. See Kuo, supra note 37, at 363–64; Vranes, supra note 30, at 99. 
 158. See Kuo, supra note 37, at 363–64. 
 159. See Solange I, supra note 32, at 281. 
 160. See Kumm, supra note 4, at 294–95; Grimm, supra note 2, at 233; Beck, 
supra note 15, at 489. 
 161. See Solange II, supra note 44, § 108. 
 162. See Cruz, supra note 58, at 404; Kumm, supra note 4, at 296; Voßkuhle, 
supra note 2, at 195. 
 163. See Möllers, supra note 106, at 166; see also Honeywell, supra note 103, 
§§ 95, 104 (Landau, J., dissenting) (arguing that the BVG majority creates 
“excessive requirements on the finding of an ultra vires act,” and therefore only 
creates an ultra vires review that exists “on paper” but not in reality). 
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assertion–ECJ adjustment–BVG jurisdictional suspension) can 
largely be seen as a form of deference each court has shown the 
other as well as a general hesitance to provoke a conflict.164 For 
its part, the ECJ has mostly addressed the actual concerns with 
the EU put forward by the BVG while studiously ignoring the 
assertions of jurisdictional oversight those concerns have 
produced. By taking care of the underlying problems identified 
by the BVG, the ECJ has successfully eliminated any necessity 
for the BVG to actually exercise its proclaimed jurisdiction. 
Finding its main concerns resolved, the BVG has dutifully 
abstained from actually using its proposed EU oversight 
capabilities, even where it has had an opportunity to do so.165 
While not solving the principles of the jurisdictional conflict, this 
pattern has successfully avoided any practical ramifications that 
conflict might create. In short, both courts have seemingly gone 
out of their way to avoid the conceptual disagreement and the 
jurisdictional issue that it has provoked. They have, in basic 
terms, up until now agreed to disagree. 
 
C.  CHANGING PATTERNS? 
 
It is arguable, however, that the OMT/Gauweiler decisions 
represent a significant shift away from conflict avoidance and 
towards a declaration of war.166 With respect to the BVG, there 
are several arguments that support this theory. First, unlike the 
prior cases in which the BVG threatened to consider an ultra 
vires complaint if circumstances lined up properly, in OMT the 
BVG officially opined that an EU act was actually ultra vires. 
Therefore, OMT is less a warning of an ultra vires finding and 
more a promise of one unless the ECJ intervenes.167 As such, it 
represents a deviation from the BVG’s established pattern. 
Second, while the BVG and the ECJ had previously worked hard 
 
 164. See Beck, supra note 15, at 486, 489, 493. 
 165. See Möllers, supra note 106, at 161 (noting that the BVG deliberately 
missed an opportunity to exercise its jurisdiction in the Bananas Case); see also 
Data Protection Case, supra note 51 (abstaining from addressing the validity of 
the EU Directive, the BVG ruled on the unconstitutionality of the German 
legislation implementing the EU Data Protection Directive instead). 
 166. See Alexander Thiele, Friendly or Unfriendly Act? The “Historic” 
Referral of the Constitutional Court to the ECJ Regarding the ECB’s OMT 
Program, 15 GER. L.J. 241, 247–48 (2014) (focusing on whether the referral by 
the BVG of the OMT question to the ECJ was intended as an “act of friendliness” 
or as a hostile first step towards an “open conflict.”). 
 167. See Pliakos, supra note 129, at 375–76. 
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to avoid potential conflicts through dialogue,168 the OMT referral 
appeared to invite such a confrontation between the two courts. 
The BVG could have simply referred the validity of the EU act 
to the ECJ for its consideration without any discussion of the 
substantive law; instead, it chose to pre-answer its own question 
as to the legitimacy of the OMT program.169 In doing so, it 
virtually invented a novel referral mechanism through which it 
could issue the ECJ with its promise to invalidate the act.170 This 
action stands in direct contrast to the impression given by the 
Honeywell standard that an ultra vires holding was a remedy of 
“last resort.”171 Instead, the BVG in OMT appeared to be 
aggressively pursuing such a finding, which is inconsistent with 
its prior strategy of warnings and confrontation avoidance. 
On the other hand, it is also quite possible to interpret the 
OMT referral as a simple continuation of the BVG’s prior 
warning and response pattern used to avert a potentially 
catastrophic disagreement between the BVG and the ECJ. 
Viewed in this light, the promise of an ultra vires holding with 
respect to the OMT program was nothing more than a simple 
notification to the ECJ as to how the BVG views the case. By 
clarifying its views beforehand, the BVG was not necessarily 
threatening the ECJ, but rather seeking to involve the ECJ in 
an extremely important decision that may very well affect the 
fate of the EU itself.172 It is also important to realize that, once 
the BVG believed that the EU act was actually ultra vires, it had 
little choice but to express its opinion to the ECJ alongside the 
referral. To have simply sent a plain referral would have left the 
ECJ blind as to the potential dangers (with respect to a 
disagreement with the BVG) inherent in their decision. In this 
manner, the BVG’s pre-answer served the same exact purpose 
as the earlier threats to invoke oversight jurisdiction that 
Solange I and Maastricht did—it made the ECJ aware of a 
problem with the EU that needed to be fixed. Lesser measures 
would not have been able to serve the same informational 
purpose; thus the pre-answer, far from being a confrontational 
device or an escalation, may have helped to avoid a possible 
 
 168. See Beck, supra note 15, at 489. 
 169. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 114; Thomas Beukers, The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht Preliminary Reference on the OMT Program: “In the 
ECB We Do Not Trust. What About You?”, 15 GER. L.J. 343–44 (2014). 
 170. See Beukers, supra note 169, at 344. 
 171. Mahlmann, supra note 102, at 1415. 
 172. See Petersen, supra note 30, at 326. 
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conflict. 
A similar technique can arguably be seen in the Lisbon 
decision as well. After introducing the possibility of identity 
review, the BVG went to great lengths to spell out those areas 
that would be considered part of Germany’s constitutional 
identity and therefore off-limits to the EU.173 While many critics 
have derided the list as being “difficult to reconcile with the 
present level of integration,”174 a “simple compilation and 
protection of remaining national powers,”175 “arbitrary,” and 
“theoretically unfounded,”176 these critiques miss the practical 
impact of the list. It serves as a warning to the EU and the ECJ 
that these areas are not eligible for further integration. 
Specifically defining these areas beforehand lessens the 
likelihood that the EU will exercise its authority in a manner 
that would require the BVG to actually use its asserted identity 
review jurisdiction.177 Thus, the list is not meant only as an 
actual description of what constitutes the German identity, but 
rather is also intended as another mechanism through which the 
BVG can avoid confrontation with the ECJ over jurisdictional 
issues. As such, taking a wider view of the warning and response 
pattern of dialogue, not only does the OMT reference fit within 
the BVG’s prior practice, but the Lisbon identity assertion (and 
definition) as well. 
The ECJ’s decision in Gauweiler, by contrast, is difficult to 
view as a continuation of the aforementioned pattern. Rather 
than avoiding a potential conflict with the BVG over the legality 
of the OMT program, the ECJ appears to have invited such a 
confrontation, even though it possessed numerous other options 
that would have deescalated the situation. For example, it could 
have followed the BVG’s lead and declared the OMT program to 
be ultra vires.178 Likewise, the ECJ could have interpreted the 
OMT program in the highly restrictive non-ultra vires manner 
suggested by the BVG in OMT, thereby keeping it within the 
competences of the EU.179 In both instances, the ECJ, by 
following the BVG’s lead as expressed in its referral decision, 
would have eliminated any grounds for conflict over the issue. 
 
 173. See Lisbon, supra note 77, §§ 252–53. 
 174. Theil, supra note 84, at 610. 
 175. Thym, supra note 31, at 1801. 
 176. Murkens, supra note 85, at 522. 
 177. See Schorkopf Lisbon, supra note 75, at 264. 
 178. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 145. 
 179. See id. at 120; Beukers, supra note 169, at 367. 
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Another alternative would have been to simply stall for 
time—the ECJ takes an average of nearly seventeen months to 
answer a preliminary reference180 and has no external, internal, 
or legal procedural requirement in normal cases to do so 
expeditiously.181 The BVG, for its part, requested neither an 
accelerated timetable for the case nor that interim measures be 
taken with respect to the OMT program during the ECJ’s 
consideration of the referral.182 As such, the ECJ could have 
simply waited until the EU economies bolstered by the OMT 
program recovered enough to stand alone and thereafter ruled 
the program invalid. This would have allowed the ECJ to avoid 
open conflict with the BVG while still preserving the practical 
and arguably necessary benefits of the OMT program. Such an 
action, though perhaps controversial and even 
counterproductive,183 would have corresponded directly with the 
warning and response pattern exhibited by the courts in 
previous conflicts. 
The ECJ did not avail itself of any of these conflict avoidance 
options; it chose instead to press forward with its ruling and 
uphold the OMT program in the face of the BVG’s apparent 
disagreement. At its worst, such an outcome might be considered 
as an outright declaration of war on the BVG. Yet, approached 
from a different angle, Gauweiler might simply be characterized 
as a turning of the tables: the ECJ has gone from adjusting its 
jurisprudence in response to BVG warnings to instead issuing 
its own warning to the BVG. In this light, Gauweiler may be 
taken as notice that the ECJ will not simply stand aside while 
the German court attempts to restrict the competence of the EU. 
At its best, this decision represents a simple change in lead, 
whereby the ECJ seeks to navigate the BVG through the legal 
pitfalls of the OMT situation according to its own interpretation 
of EU law, rather than following the BVG’s directions from 
OMT. 
 
 180. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 121. 
 181. See Consolidated EU Treaty, supra note 24, at art. 19; Title III—
References for a Preliminary Ruling—Consolidated Version of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 265) 1, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L:2012:265:
FULL&from=EN (last visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
 182. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 123. 
 183. See Beukers, supra note 169, at 364 (arguing that the restrictions 
already placed upon German participation in the OMT program render it less 
effective in the meantime and that an expedited review might be more 
beneficial). 
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D. PEERING INTO THE SHORT-TERM FUTURE 
 
 Of course, such changes in lead only work where the party 
previously in the lead is willing to take on a deferential role. In 
this respect, the responsibility for avoiding a foundational crisis 
now appears to be entirely in the hands of the BVG. In the past, 
the ECJ has proven that it was prepared to adjust its 
jurisprudence to avoid potential conflicts. The question becomes 
whether the BVG is now willing to do the same. If it is, then a 
confrontation over the OMT program may be avoided. This 
would require the BVG repudiating or rethinking its pre-answer 
and following the ECJ’s reasoning instead.184 Such a result 
would provide some evidence as to the relative interest both 
courts have in asserting their conceptual principles and further 
strengthen the view that neither court is particularly interested 
in fomenting a foundational crisis in the EU. 
Nevertheless, after Gauweiler, the chances of a potentially 
catastrophic confrontation appear to have increased 
significantly. If the BVG chooses to abide by its pre-answer 
reasoning and finds the OMT program to be ultra vires, a 
legitimate foundational crisis might occur.185 Even if the BVG 
reverses course and adheres to the ECJ’s reasoning on the ultra 
vires aspect of the OMT program, it could still instigate a crisis 
by ruling that the program infringes upon Germany’s 
constitutional identity (an option that it specifically left open 
pending the ECJ’s handling of the preliminary reference).186 The 
creation of such an impasse might not be solvable through the 
established legal mechanisms, but would likely require a 
political intervention instead.187 
Of course, speculation as to the ultimate impact and 
importance of the OMT/Gauweiler decisions is rather limited in 
its utility, especially considering that the litigation is still 
ongoing. What can be said definitively at this point, is that 
regardless of the eventual outcome, the OMT/Gauweiler 
litigation will shed some much-needed light on the legal 
relationship between Germany and the EU. In this respect, it 
will have helped clarify not only the BVG’s position, but the 
ECJ’s as well. 
 
 184. See Mayer, supra note 23, at 145; Petersen, supra note 30, at 326–27. 
 185. See Beukers, supra note 169, at 365; Mayer, supra note 23, at 124; 
Pliakos, supra note 129, at 378–79. 
 186. See OMT, supra note 128, ¶ 102; Mayer, supra note 23, at 131–32. 
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E.  PEERING INTO THE LONG-TERM FUTURE 
Even if the current OMT/Gauweiler litigation is resolved 
without further incident, there still remains “a potential for 
conflict embedded in the system” that arguably muddies the 
long-term prospects of the EU.188 Assuming that any 
OMT/Gauweiler resolution results in neither the ECJ nor the 
BVG overtly backing down from their present jurisdictional 
principles, both courts will retain the potential to incite another 
jurisdictional clash going forward. Additionally, other national 
constitutional courts also claim the power to “set aside EU [l]aw 
on constitutional grounds under certain circumstances”189 and 
thus also have the ability to provoke a crisis. Further, the 
influential stature of the BVG190 likely invites more Member 
State constitutional courts to follow its lead and assert similar 
or identical oversight jurisdictions.191 The existence of several 
Member State constitutional courts exercising such review 
doctrines not only multiplies the probability that such a court 
would openly incite (or even stumble into) a foundational crisis, 
but the increased acceptability of these jurisdictional doctrines 
(and the hazard they pose to the EU) may provoke the ECJ itself 
to step in and attempt to halt their spread, thereby creating its 
own conflict. Indeed, the BVG itself has recognized the danger 
to the EU inherent in every Member State exercising ultra vires 
jurisdiction; this was one of the reasons for the near 
impossibility of the Honeywell standard.192 
In addition to a considerable number of institutional 
candidates capable of provoking a crisis, there are also a 
substantial number of substantive areas from which such a 
crisis might arise. While it is true that certain areas of EU law 
are less likely than others to create a conflict over EU 
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competences, the ambiguity of the EU treaty is such that there 
will “always be a blurred zone at the points of intersection 
between the powers of the Member States and the Union.”193 
Thus, debate concerning the conferred powers may always serve 
as a possible source of foundational conflict, as might the 
ongoing dispute over the ECJ’s claim to an exclusive right to 
interpret the extent of its own competences under those powers 
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz).194 
Also, national constitutional identity, as introduced in 
Lisbon, is fertile ground for future disagreement,195 especially 
given the expansive list of German identity areas presented as 
exempt from integration by the BVG in Lisbon. If it is a given 
that the EU exhibits a “tendency of political self-
enhancement”196 and that the ECJ, as the “motor of 
integration,”197 enables this through its dynamic interpretation 
of the treaties, then it is highly probable that the dynamically 
developing competences of the EU will eventually transgress 
upon the forbidden areas of German identity. In this context as 
well, an increasing acceptance of oversight jurisdiction by 
Member State constitutional courts may spell disaster because 
constitutional identity is specific to each Member State.198 Thus, 
the outlines of “off-limit” areas around which the EU must 
maneuver will vary from Member State to Member State, likely 
increasing the odds that an accidental transgression into an 
identity area in at least one State will ultimately occur. 
Also, there will always be individuals or political actors in 
every Member State with a vested interest in challenging the 
authority or legitimacy of the EU in order to undermine its 
effectiveness. Evidence of this can be seen not only in the media 
headlines surrounding the negotiation of any new EU treaty or 
the ultimate unpopularity of the rejected Constitutional 
Treaty,199 but also in the fact that both the Maastricht200 and 
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Lisbon201 treaties were challenged in several Member State 
constitutional courts. The wide range of legal issues on which 
such individuals can attack EU actions in national courts means 
that there will be an ever-present supply of opportunities for the 
Member State constitutional courts that have embraced EU 
oversight doctrines similar to those found in Germany, to 
exercise their jurisdiction and potentially provoke a 
foundational crisis. In short, there exists abundant legal 
grounds from which a potentially catastrophic case can arise, 
numerous Member State courts willing to exercise jurisdiction 
over such cases, and a sufficient number of individuals willing 
to bring these issues to the attention of those courts. Given these 
circumstances, it would hardly be surprising if a foundational 
crisis in the EU were to occur. 
V. CONCLUSORY REMARKS 
The legal relationship between Germany and the EU 
personifies a more general conceptual difference between how 
the EU views itself and how the Member States view it. In the 
context of Germany, the end result is a divergence in legal 
doctrines with respect to the relative jurisdictional abilities of 
the BVG and the ECJ: each believes that their respective legal 
system ultimately has primacy over the other and retains the 
jurisdiction to enforce that primacy. That the BVG and ECJ have 
managed to co-exist for over four decades while substantively 
disagreeing as to which one reigns supreme is a testament to 
their conflict avoidance skills and pragmatism.202 As a former 
U.S. Attorney General once noted, “if necessity is the mother of 
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invention, it’s the father of cooperation,”203 and the potentially 
catastrophic results that would follow a concrete disagreement 
between the two courts over issues of EU competence or 
constitutional court jurisdiction over those competences have 
long since necessitated intensive cooperation between the BVG 
and ECJ. 
However, relying on this cooperation to avert a potential 
foundational crisis in the EU is a fairly dangerous strategy, 
regardless of its sustained historical success. For one thing, as 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has mentioned, the 
successful avoidance of inter-court conflicts is often “judge 
specific; it may, or may not, continue to exist over time.”204 Thus, 
as the members of the BVG and ECJ change with time, the 
ability or interest of both courts in avoiding a conflict may wax 
and wane. Moreover, while the BVG and ECJ case law examined 
above provides numerous examples where both courts have 
worked well in the past to avoid such a disastrous conflict, those 
same cases offer ample evidence that both courts have been 
slowly inching closer and closer to a collision. The looming 
conflict is a bit like nightfall: it may not have arrived yet, but 
that does not mean it is not coming. Indeed, with the escalation 
of the OMT/Gauweiler litigation, it may already be present. 
In fact, even if the OMT/Gauweiler situation is resolved 
without a major confrontation, it is very difficult to imagine that 
a crisis will not eventually arrive. The ECJ cannot allow the 
Member State constitutional courts to actually exercise 
oversight with respect to the EU competences and declare EU 
acts invalid, for to do so would ultimately undermine the 
uniformity of EU law205 and destroy the legal basis of the EU.206 
On the other hand, the BVG is not likely to disavow the legal 
principles that it has developed over the past forty years, and 
likely could not do so without significantly losing face at both the 
national and European levels. Thus, the disagreement will 
persist, and any attempt by either court to actually settle the 
discrepancy in its favor may precipitate the very conflict that 
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both courts have actively been trying to avoid.207 Consequently, 
since neither side is likely to voluntarily alter its stance on the 
issue, and neither can end the disagreement in any other way, 
the best that can be hoped for is continued avoidance of the issue 
by both sides. While not exactly a comforting result, it is clearly 
better than the alternatives. And, as the BVG and ECJ case law 
discussed above shows, it is the approach historically taken by 
both sides in this regard. Whether the OMT/Gauweiler litigation 
represents a continuation of this avoidance pattern or a 
renewed, enlarged willingness on the part of the BVG to assert 
its jurisdiction remains to be seen. Regardless, the BVG’s 
anticipated reaction to the Gauweiler decision and the eventual 
resolution of the overall case, will go some way towards further 
clarifying the legal relationship between Germany and the EU. 
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